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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Telecommunications and C3I Policy Issues (U)

Last month, you requested my reaction to five proposed objectives which could serve as the basis for a national security telecommunications policy. I endorse your concept and support the objectives you proposed. However, these objectives alone may not provide adequate guidance for governmental, legislative and industry actions to enhance telecommunications capabilities. Therefore, I have prepared the attached alternative statement of national security telecommunications policy which, I believe, might be more useful for this effort. The statement is unclassified, so as to allow broad discussion and dissemination. I believe a policy statement along these lines, endorsed by the President, could have a significant impact on the Congress, Executive Branch planning efforts, the Federal Communications Commission and the telecommunications industry as a whole.

I also agree that a meeting of the Special Coordination Committee to discuss a national security telecommunications policy and related C3I issues would be most desirable.

Hardd Brown

Attachment

On file OSD release instructions apply.

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MATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

It is essential to the national security of the United States to have telecommunications facilities adequate to satisfy the needs of the nation during and after any national emergency. This is required in order to gather intelligence, conduct diplomacy, execute command and control of the military forces, provide for continuity of essential governmental functions, and reconstitute the political, economic and social structure of the nation. It is national policy that the telecommunications resources of the country shall have the flexibility, residual capacity and restorability to satisfy these needs.

in support of national security policy and strategy, the nation's telecommunications must provide for:

- Connectivity between the National Command Authority and strategic forces to support flexible execution of retaliatory strikes during and after enemy nuclear attack.
- Responsive support for operational control of the armed forces, even during a protracted nuclear war.
 - Support of mobilization in all circumstances.
- Support of National Command Authority participation in alliance decision making.
- Continuity of government during and after a nuclear war or natural disaster.
- Recovery of the nation during and after a nuclear war or natural disaster.

The following objectives are established:

- National security and continuity of government telecommunications requirements should have priority in the restoration of services and facilities in national emergencies.
- -. Interstate common carrier networks (including specialized common carriers and domestic satellite carriers) shall be interconnected and capable of interoperation in emergencies at selected, proximate, breakout points outside of likely target areas.
- Outside of likely target areas, the backbone facilities of interstate common carriers should be situated to avoid collateral damage from nuclear attack. The government will make available the necessary information to allow such siting.

- The government shall plan for emergency use of industry private line communications (pipeline, railroad, airline, etc.) that have significant capabilities.
- All functionally similar government telecommunications networks shall be capable of interchange of traffic in emergencies.
- A national telecommunications control system is required to manage the restoration and reconstitution of the national telecommunications system following an emergency.
- All private line and public communications which carry information vital to the national security shall be protected from exploitation by hostile powers.
- The government will place substantial reliance upon the private sector for advice and assistance in achieving national security and preparedness goals.

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Remarks:

Attached per your request is item #6 from the 27 Sept. DDJ.

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